TRUTH BEHIND TALES OF TEMPLE DESTRUCTION
			Name of the Book: Temple Destruction and Muslim States in 
			Medieval India  
			Author: Richard M. Eaton,  
			Publisher: Hope India, Gurgaon (hope_india@indiatimes.com)  
			Year: 2004 Pages: 101 Price: Rs.225 ISBN: 81-7871-027-7 
			Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand 
			Central to the diverse memories of Hindus and Muslims in India 
			about the history of Hindu-Muslim relations are incidents or claims 
			of the destruction of Hindu temples by Muslim rulers. These memories 
			are a defining element in the construction of contemporary communal 
			identities. Some Muslims see medieval Muslims Sultans who are said 
			to have destroyed temples as valiant heroes who struggled against 
			Brahminism, idolatry and polytheism. For many Hindus, these very 
			kings are the epitome of evil and godlessness. 
			The theme of the iconoclast Muslim Sultan is routinely put to use 
			for political mobilization by communal forces, as so tragically 
			illustrated in the case of the Babri Masjid controversy, resulting 
			in the deaths of thousands of people. Not content with that, 
			Hindutva forces are on record as declaring that they aim at 
			destroying or capturing some 30,000 mosques and Muslim shrines, 
			which, they claim, were built on the sites of Hindu temples 
			allegedly destroyed by Muslim rulers. Hindutva literature is replete 
			with exhortations to Hindus to avenge the misdeeds, both real and 
			imaginary, of medieval Muslim kings, including destruction of 
			temples. This propaganda and the communal mobilization that it has 
			provoked have resulted in a sharp deterioration of inter-communal 
			relations in recent years. 
			That some Muslim kings did indeed destroy certain Hindu temples 
			is an undeniable fact, which even most Muslims familiar with 
			medieval history would readily concede. However, as this remarkable 
			book by the noted historian Richard Eaton points out, extreme 
			caution needs to be exercised in accepting the claims of medieval 
			historians as well as in interpreting past events in terms of 
			today’s categories. Failure to do this, he says, has resulted in the 
			construction of the image of all Muslims as allegedly fired by an 
			irrepressible hatred of Hindus, a gross distortion of actual 
			history. 
			The notion of the Muslim Sultan as temple-breaker, Eaton says, 
			derives essentially from history texts written by British colonial 
			administrators, who, in turn, drew upon Persian chronicles by Muslim 
			historians attached to the courts of various Indian Muslim rulers. 
			Eaton argues that British colonial historians were at pains to 
			project the image of Muslim rulers as wholly oppressive and 
			anti-Hindu, in order to present British rule as enlightened and 
			civilized and thereby enlist Hindu support. For this they carefully 
			selected from the earlier Persian chronicles those reports that 
			glorified various Muslim Sultans as destroyers of temples and 
			presented these as proof that Hindus and Muslims could not possibly 
			live peacefully with each other without the presence of the British 
			to rule over them to prevent them from massacring each other. 
			Although some of these reports quoted in British texts were true, 
			many others were simply the figment of the imagination of court 
			chroniclers anxious to present their royal patrons as great 
			champions of Islamic orthodoxy even if in actual fact these rulers 
			were lax Muslims. 
			Dealing with actual instances of temple-breaking by Muslim 
			rulers, Eaton appeals for a more nuanced approach, arguing that in 
			most cases these occurred not simply or mainly because of religious 
			zeal. Thus, the raids on temples by the eleventh century Mahmud 
			Ghaznavi must be seen as motivated, at least in part, by the desire 
			for loot, since the temples he destroyed were richly endowed with 
			gold and jewels, which he used to finance his plundering activities 
			against other Muslim rulers in Afghanistan, Iran and elsewhere. 
			Beginning in the early thirteenth century, the Delhi Sultans’ policy 
			of selective temple desecration aimed, not as in the earlier 
			Ghaznavid period, to finance distant military operations on the 
			Iranian plateau but to de-legitimize and extirpate defeated Indian 
			ruling houses. The process of Indo-Muslim state building, Eaton 
			says, entailed the sweeping away of all prior political authority in 
			newly conquered territories. When such authority was vested in a 
			ruler whose own legitimacy was associated with a royal temple, 
			typically one that housed idol of ruling dynasty’s state-deity, that 
			temple was normally looted or destroyed or converted into a mosque, 
			which succeeded in ‘detaching the defeated raja from the most 
			prominent manifestation of his former legitimacy’. Temples that were 
			not so identified were normally left untouched. Hence, Eaton writes, 
			it is wrong to explain this phenomenon by appealing to what he calls 
			as an ‘essentialized theology of iconoclasm felt to be intrinsic to 
			Islam’. 
			Royal temple complexes were pre-eminently political institutions, 
			Eaton says. The central icon, housed in a royal temple’s garba griha 
			or ‘womb-chamber’ and inhabited by the state-deity of the temple’s 
			royal patron, expressed the ‘shared sovereignty of king and deity’. 
			Therefore, Eaton stresses, temple-breaking, especially of temples 
			associated with ruling houses, was essentially a political, rather 
			than simply religious, act. As proof of this thesis he cites 
			instances of the sacking of royal temples of Hindu rulers by rival 
			Hindu kings as early as the sixth century C.E.. In AD 642 CE the 
			Pallava king Narashimhavarman I looted the image of Ganesha from the 
			Chalukyan capital of Vatapi.. In the eighth century, Bengali troops 
			sought revenge on king Lalitaditya by destroying what they thought 
			was the image of Vishnu Vaikuntha, the state deity of Lalitaditya's 
			kingdom in Kashmir. In the early ninth century the Pandyan king 
			Srimara Srivallabha also invaded Sri Lanka and took back to his 
			capital a golden Buddha image that had been installed in the 
			kingdom's Jewel Palace. In the early eleventh century the Chola king 
			Rajendra I furnished his capital with images he had seized from 
			several neighboring Chalukya, Kalinga and Pala rulers. In the 
			mid-eleventh century the Chola king Rajadhiraja defeated the 
			Chalukyas and plundered Kalyani, taking a large black stone door 
			guardian to his capital in Thanjavur, where it was displayed to his 
			subjects as a trophy of war. In addition to looting royal temples 
			and carrying off images of state deities, some Hindu kings, like 
			some of their later Muslim counterparts, engaged in the destruction 
			of the royal temples of their political adversaries. In the early 
			tenth century, the Rashtrakuta monarch Indra III not only destroyed 
			the temple of Kalapriya (at Kalpa near the Jamuna River), patronized 
			by the Pratiharas, but, Eaton writes, ‘took special delight in 
			recording the fact’. 
			This and other such evidence clearly suggests, Eaton argues, that 
			‘temples had been the natural sites for the contestation of kingly 
			authority well before the coming of Muslim Turks to India’. Hence, 
			the Turkish invaders, in seeking to establish themselves as rulers, 
			followed a pattern that had already been established before their 
			arrival in India. Yet, the iconoclastic zeal of the Muslim rulers of 
			India must not be exaggerated, Eaton says. He claims that based on 
			evidence from epigraphic and literary evidence spanning a period of 
			more than five centuries (1192-1729), ‘one may identify eighty 
			instances of temple desecration whose historicity appears reasonably 
			certain’, a figure much less than what Hindutva ideologues today 
			claim. 
			In judging these incidents, extreme caution is necessary, Eaton 
			suggests. These temples were destroyed not by ‘ordinary’ Muslims, 
			but, rather, by officials of the state. Further, the timing and 
			location of these incidents is also significant. Most of them 
			occurred, Eaton says, on ‘the cutting edge of a moving military 
			frontier’, in the course of military raids or invasions of 
			neighboring territories ruled by Hindu kings. Once Muslim rulers had 
			conquered a particular territory and incorporated it into their 
			kingdom typically such incidents were few, if at all. When Muslim 
			rulers grew mainly at the expense of other Muslim ruling houses, 
			temple desecration was rare, which explains, for instance, why there 
			is no firm evidence of the early Mughal rulers Babar and Humayun, 
			whose principal adversaries were Afghans, in engaging in temple 
			desecration, including, strikingly, in Ayodhya. Certain later Mughal 
			and other rulers are said to have engaged in the destruction of 
			royal temples and building mosques on their sites in territories 
			ruled by rebel chieftains. These acts were intended to be 
			punishments for rebellion, and once rebellions were quelled few such 
			incidents took place. 
			Whatever form they took, Eaton says, ‘acts of temple desecration 
			were never directed at the people, but at the enemy king and the 
			image that incarnated and displayed his state-deity’. Eaton cites in 
			this regard a contemporary description of a 1661 Mughal campaign in 
			Kuch Bihar, northern Bengal, which resulted in the annexation of the 
			region, makes it clear that Mughal authorities were guided by two 
			principal concerns: to destroy the image of the state-deity of the 
			defeated Raja, Bhim Narayana and to prevent Mughal troops from 
			looting or in any way harming the general population of Kuch Bihar. 
			Accordingly, the chief judge of Mughal Bengal, Saiyid Muhammad 
			Sadiq, was directed to issue prohibitory orders that nobody was to 
			touch the property of the people. Sayyid Sadiq, Eaton tells us, 
			‘issued strict prohibitory orders so that nobody had the courage to 
			break the laws or to plunder the property of the inhabitants. The 
			punishment for disobeying the order was that the hands, ears or 
			noses of the plunderers were cut’. In newly annexed areas formerly 
			ruled by non-Muslims, as in the case of Kuch Bihar, Eaton goes on, 
			‘Mughal officers took appropriate measures to secure the support of 
			the common people, who after all created the material wealth upon 
			which the entire imperial edifice rested’. 
			The theory that politics, rather than simple religious zeal, lay 
			behind most instances of temple-breaking by Muslim rulers is 
			strengthened by the fact that, as Eaton points out, once Hindu Rajas 
			were defeated by Muslim kings and their territories annexed, 
			pragmatism dictated that temples within the Emperor’s realm remained 
			unharmed. This was the case even with the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, 
			generally projected as the epitome of Muslim iconoclasm. Eaton 
			quotes an order issued by Aurangzeb to local officials in Benares in 
			1659 to provide protection to the Brahman temple functionaries 
			there, together with the temples at which they officiated. The order 
			reads: 
			In these days information has reached our court that several 
			people have, out of spite and rancor, harassed the Hindu residents 
			of Benares and nearby places, including a group of Brahmans who are 
			in charge of ancient temples there. These people want to remove 
			those Brahmans from their charge of temple-keeping, which has caused 
			them considerable distress. Therefore, upon receiving this order, 
			you must see that nobody unlawfully disturbs the Brahmans or other 
			Hindus of that region, so that they might remain in their 
			traditional place and pray for the continuance of the Empire. 
			
			Justifying this order, Aurangzeb asserted, ‘According to the Holy 
			Law (shari'at) and the exalted creed, it has been established that 
			ancient temples should not be torn down’. At the same time, he added 
			that no new temples should be built, a marked departure from the 
			policy of Akbar. However, Eaton says that this order appears to have 
			applied only to Benares because many new temples were built 
			elsewhere in India during Aurangzeb's reign. 
			Eaton thus seeks to dismiss the notion that various Muslim rulers 
			in India wantonly engaged in destroying Hindu temples, allegedly 
			driven by a ‘theology of iconoclasm’. Such a picture, he insists, 
			cannot, sustained by evidence from original sources from the early 
			thirteenth century onwards. Had instances of temple desecration been 
			driven by a ‘theology of iconoclasm’, he argues, this would have 
			‘committed Muslims in India to destroying all temples everywhere, 
			including ordinary village temples, as opposed to the highly 
			selective operation that seems actually to have taken place’. In 
			contrast, Eaton’s meticulous research leads him to believe that ‘the 
			original data associate instances of temple desecration with the 
			annexation of newly conquered territories held by enemy kings whose 
			domains lay on the path of moving military frontiers. Temple 
			desecration also occurred when Hindu patrons of prominent temples 
			committed acts of treason or disloyalty to the Indo-Muslim states 
			they served’. Otherwise, he notes, ‘temples lying within Indo-Muslim 
			sovereign domains, viewed normally as protected state property, were 
			left unmolested’. 
			This slim volume is a path-breaking book, a passionate protest 
			against the horrendous uses to which the notion of the ‘theology of 
			iconoclasm’ has been put by contemporary Hindutva ideologues to 
			justify murder in the name of avenging ‘historical wrongs’. It 
			urgently deserves to be translated into various Indian languages and 
			made readily available at a more affordable price.